Anti-Competitive Agreements

Anti-Competitive Agreements


This is a co-authored article written by Miss. Anshumi Maloo and Miss. Riya Chelani, students of Unitedworld School of Law, Karnavati University, Gandhinagar.

A huge take-off from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, the Competition Act, 2002 rejuvenates security against predominance, cartels and unreasonable exchange rehearses. It utilizes against serious measures to this end, the considerable and legal composition of which frames the subject of the current paper.

The writers illuminate the authoritative commitment to spreading mindfulness about rivalry law in India just as on the escape clauses present in the rule, thusly tormenting legal decisions with equivocalness. Given the beginning phase of the advancement of rivalry law in India, it is contended that the presentation of the Competition Commission of India can be fundamentally improved which will loan a lot of required assurance and lucidity in the comprehension of the law.


The agreement is defined under Section 2(b) of the Competition Act[1] Agreement is relating to production, supply, distribution, storage, or control of goods or services which cause an unfavorable impact on rivalry in India will be void. Understanding generally characterized as even a gesture or a wink that can get the job done. It need not be composed, covers oral understandings also. Direct verification of arrangement not needed, might be contingent from realities, the fortuitous proof is sufficient.

Cartel is a vital piece of something very similar. Cartel incorporates a relationship of makers, merchants, wholesalers, dealers, or specialist co-ops who, by arrangement among themselves, cut-off, control, or endeavor to control the creation, dissemination, deal, or cost of, or, exchange merchandise or arrangement of administrations. Cartel is a mystery and not public, they work under the skin.[2] Against Competitive Arrangements Anti-serious game plans are those that have as their item to, or really impact in forestalling, limiting or twisting rivalry in any market in India.

Such game plans cover arrangements, yet additionally choices made by the relationship of people/undertakings, just as the lead of gatherings acting in intrigue. Antagonistic impact on rivalry alludes not to a specific rundown of arrangements, but rather to specific financial results which might be delivered by very various kinds of arrangements in fluctuating time and conditions. It by and large alludes to any activity which works to the bias of the public interests by unduly confining rivalry or unduly hindering proper way of exchange.

Any demonstration which basically blocks the free progression of trade between the states, or limits, the freedom of a merchant to participate in the business, including restrictions of exchange pointed toward convincing outsiders and outsiders automatically not to take part in some other exchange, is said to have a considerable unfriendly impact on rivalry. Hostile to serious arrangements are additionally grouped into Horizontal arrangements and Vertical arrangements.

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Horizontal Agreements

Horizontal agreements are arrangements between ventures at the indistinguishable phase of creation. Section 3(3) of the Act[3] provides that such agreements incorporate in identical or similar trade of products or provision of services, which- directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices Limits or controls production, supply Shares the market or source of production Directly or indirectly ends up n offer apparatus or conniving offering under this act horizontal agreement are put in an extremely exceptional category and are dependent upon the unfriendly assumption of being anti-competitive.

This can be also called the ‘per se’ rule. this means that if there exists a horizontal agreement under Section 3(3) of the Act, then it’ll be presumed that such an agreement is anti-competitive and has an appreciable adverse effect on competition[4].

Certain Key Issues under Horizontal Agreements:[5]

  1. Limiting production or supply- All choices on-increment or abatement of Production, deals or limit, passage into new markets, limit usage, and so on ought to be taken autonomously. Any understanding/understanding on the above between contenders may raise concerns it’s best to stay a record of independent business reasons for any decisions regarding the identical.
  2. Market sharing- There shouldn’t be any formal or informal agreement or understanding with competitors in regard to sharing of territories/products. Competitors must not agree to not target each other customers (regardless of the scale of those customers).
  3. Bid-rigging- Any arrangement ¦which takes out or diminishing rivalry for offers or unfavorably influencing or controlling the strategy for the offering. Common types of bid-rigging:
  1. Bid suppression,
  2. Complementary bidding,
  • Bid rotation,
  1. Agreements to not bid against one another or squeeze other bidders,
  2. Agreements on common terms or pricing formulae.

A.R. Polymers Case[6] – the COMPAT overturned the CCI decision on the grounds that CCI and also the DG didn’t give due weightage to the character of the marketplace for jungle boots, manner during which the tender is conducted, and execution of the speed contract to attain finding of bid-rigging solely on the grounds of identical pricing.[7]

Freedom of Press

Vertical Agreement

Vertical agreements are those which are gone into at least two enterprises working at various levels of creation[8]. For example between suppliers and dealers. Other samples of anti-competitive vertical agreements include:

Exclusive supply agreement & refusal to deal

Resale price maintenance[9]


Exclusive contract

The ‘per se’ rule as applicable for horizontal agreements doesn’t apply for vertical agreements. Hence, a vertical agreement isn’t in and of itself anti-competitive or doesn’t have an appreciable adverse effect on competition.[10]

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Different kinds of vertical agreements:

1.Tie-In Arrangement– it includes any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods, as a credit condition of such purchase, to purchase goods in the market. It includes wherein there exists a dealer who consents to sell attractive item or administration which are tying the item just on pre-condition that purchaser will buy a less alluring second item or administration, for example, the tied item regardless of the way that if the purchaser needs the subsequent item.

It is concurrence with a condition that gathering will sell the item just depending on the prerequisite that purchaser will likewise purchase another item. In re. Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd. the weight of confirmation is one the offended party who foundations the case fundamentally infringement to demonstrate that:-

  •  The merchant adopted the offer of an item or administration on the acquisition of second. o That the two items or administrations are two separate items that they are not pieces of a similar item.
  • That the merchant has adequate situation available for binds the item to authorize it.

In Apple Case:

Necessary Ingredients-Presence of two separate items or administrations fit for being tied, Seller: adequate financial force in binds great to control rivalry in tied great, and Tying course of action influences a not inadequate measure of trade.

Fx Enterprises v. Hyundai Motor India Limited Allegations[11]:

Hyundai went into restrictive stockpile arrangements and refusal to bargain game plans with its wholesalers. Further, by recommending the most extreme admissible limits to its vendors, it was affirmed that it was taking part in resale value upkeep. Moreover, it was asserted that it tied offer of CNG units, greases, oils, and vehicle protection.

2. Exclusive Supply Agreements– Exclusive Supply Agreements-Exclusive stockpile arrangement incorporates any understanding confining in any way the buyer throughout his exchange from getting or in any case managing in any merchandise other than those of the vendor or some other individual.[12]

For example, if a vendor/merchant is precluded from managing merchandise of the providers, contenders. Selective stockpile arrangements have been held to be allowable, where dispassionately supported- Such as to shield from free-riding, to guarantee the wellbeing of speculation, and guarantee nature of provisions.

In the Intel Case – The CCI held that a prerequisite to educate the provider when the wholesaler arrangements with items having a place with the providers, contenders can’t add up to an elite inventory game plan.

Exclusive Supply Agreements-elite dispersion arrangement incorporates any consent to restrict, limit or retain the yield or supply of any merchandise or allot any region or market for the removal or offer of the products.

3. Exclusive distribution agreement- This incorporates any consent to restrain, limit or retain the yield or flexibility of any products or designate any territory or market for the removal or offer of merchandise.

4. Resale Price Maintenance– Resale value support remembers any consent to offer products for a condition that the costs to be charged on the resale by the buyer will be the costs specified by the vendor except if it is obviously expressed that costs lower than those costs might be charged.[13]

Intel: where a provider only gave a proposed cost to the merchant as a rule, and wholesalers were from that point allowed to choose the resale value, no instance of :

Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. and Ors[14]

– Violations of Section 3 and 4 Allegations:

Car producers had gone into hostile to serious concurrences with their Original Equipment Suppliers (OESs) and approved vendors, confining offer of extra parts and devices in the open market. It was additionally asserted that the vehicle makers were manhandling their prevailing situation by limiting the OESs from providing their extra parts in the open market.

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Remedies to Anti-competitive Agreements

After a request if the commission tracks down that the understanding being referred to falls inside the classification of Section 3, it can pass any of the accompanying requests all things considered:[15]

  1. Direct the individual, undertaking or affiliation engaged with the consent to stop or remerge such agreement;
  2. Force such punishments on individual endeavor or relationship, as it considers fit. Such punishments will not surpass a modest amount of the normal turnover for the previous three monetary years
  3. In instances of cartels the punishments referenced above will stretch out to every maker, dealer, wholesaler, broker or specialist organization remembered for that cartel and the measure of punishment could broaden up to either multiple times of its benefit for every time of the understanding’s continuation or 10%, whichever is higher.
  4. Direct for adjustment of the consent to the degree and in the way as might be determined in the request for the commission.
  5. Installment of cost and giving of headings to the undertaking to agree with the orders.
  6. Pass any such request or course as it might deem fit.

Anti-Competitive Agreements And IPR Exemption Under Section 3(5) Of The Act

Section 3(5) of the Competition Act envisages that nothing contained in Section 3 (prohibiting anti-competitive agreements) shall restrict the proper of any individual to stop infringement or imposing of reasonable conditions which will be necessary for safeguarding his/her property rights i.e. copyright, trademark, patent, designs, and geographical indications.[16]

In the aforesaid context, CCI states that any ‘reasonable condition’ imposed for the cover of IPR wouldn’t attract Section 3, however, imposition of ‘unreasonable condition’ to guard IPR would contravene Section 3 of the Act. The CCI gives an illustrative rundown of practices/understandings which however went into for front of IPR may contradict Section 3 of the Act[17]. Such practices/agreements are:

  1. Patent pooling- could also be a restrictive practice if pooling firms decide to not grant a license to 3rd parties;
  2. Tie-in arrangement– If under the tying arrangement, the licensee is required to amass particular goods solely from the patentee then it should be a restrictive practice;
  3. Agreement proceeds with the installment of eminence considerably after the patent have lapsed;
  4. Clause restricting competition in R & D;
  5. The licensee could also be subjected to a condition to not challenge the validity of the IPR in question.
  6. Licensor fixes the worth at which the licensee should sell.
  7. A licensee is also coerced by the licensor to require several licenses in material possession while the Licensee might not need all of them.
  8. Condition imposing internal control on the licensed patented product beyond those necessary.
  9. Restricting licensee’s right to sell the merchandise of the licensed know-how to persons apart from those designated by the licensor.
  10. Undue restriction on licensee’s business can be anticompetitive.
  11. Limiting the most amount of use the licensee may make of the patented invention may affect competition.
  12. The condition imposed on the licensee to use or use staff designated by the licensor.[18]

Shamsher Kataria’s case has elaborately forbidden the provision of IPR exemption under Section 3(5) of the Act. Inside the case, the OPs had guaranteed IPR exclusion under Section 3(5) of the Act and expressed that the limitations forced upon the OESs (unique hardware providers) from undertaking sales of their proprietary parts to 3rd parties without seeking prior consent would fall within the ambit of reasonable condition to forestall infringements of their IPRs.

The Commission observed that so as to see whether an exemption under Section 3(5) of the Act is on the market or not, it absolutely was necessary to consider:

  1. a) Whether the correct which is recommend is correctly characterized as protecting intellectual property?
  2. b) Whether the necessities of the law granting the IPRs are after all being satisfied?

The CCI seeable of the facts and circumstances prevailing within the case held that the exemption enshrined under Section 3(5) of the Act wasn’t available to those OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) who had did not submit the relevant documents evidencing the grant of the applicable IPRs in India, with regard to the assorted spare parts.

The CCI also stated that the OEMs had didn’t show that the impugned restrictions amounted to imposition of reasonable conditions, as is also necessary for the defense of any of their rights.[19]

The CCI within the case also rendered the clarification that though registration of an IPR doesn’t automatically entitle a corporation to hunt exemption under Section 3(5)(i) of the Act and therefore the essential criteria for determining whether the exemption under Section 3(5)(i) is obtainable or not is to assess whether the condition imposed by the IPR holder may be termed as “weight of sensible conditions, as is in like manner fundamental for the security of any of his Rights”.[20]


The Act aims to stop practices by parties that are anti-competitive or harmful to the market. It can be ensured when there’s freedom of trade and protect the interest of all the parties. This aim can’t be followed unless cartels are removed and every one of the principles within the Act is followed. it’s important for the parties while doing business in India to stay a check on retaining any anti-competitive element within the agreements between them.

Enterprises should be proactive and diligent to spot the prevailing anti-competitive elements from their current agreements. There must be a training program for a better understanding of the implications of anti-competitive agreements and the way to avoid that.

[1] Competition Act, 2002


[3] Explanation to Section 3 (3) of the Competition Act, 2002

[4] Neeraj Malhotra vs Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance


[6]  Appeal No. 34 of 2013, 12 April 2016


[8] Fx Enterprise Solutions India v. Hyundai Motor India Limited, CCI (Case no. 36 &42 of 2014)

[9] Explanation to Section 3 (4) of the Competition Act, 2002


[11] Case no. 36 and 82 of 2014, 14 June 2017


[13] Supra 3

[14] Case No. 60 of 2014, 9 December 2016

[15] FICCI -Multiplex Association of India v. United Producers/ Distributors Forum & Ors., 2011 CompLR 0079 (CCI) [Competition Commission of India].

[16] Internet Service Providers Association of India v. Department of Telecommunications, MANU/CO/0018/2010 [Competition Commission of India].

[17] Competition Commission of India; Advocacy Booklet on Intellectual Property Rights under the Competition Act, 2002

[18] Automobiles Dealers Association, Hathras, UP v. Global Automobiles & Ors. and Pooja Expo India Private Limited, 2012 CompLR 827 (CCI) [Competition Commission of India].

[19] In this context, the CCI observed that the economic rationale for IR to enter into the agreement in question with SAIL was the assurance of ready supplies, and SAIL entered into the exclusive arrangement at the behest of the Ministry of Railways, in national interest.

[20] Vijay Gupta v. M/s Paper Merchants Association, Delhi & Ors., MANU/CO/0010/2011 [Competition Commission of India].

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